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VI. LIBEL AND PRIVACY
A. Fictional Work Not Defamatory
New York law has been extended by another case disallowing a
cause of action for defamation arising from a fictional work.' In
Springer v. Viking Press,2 the court held there was no cause of action
for defamation. The case concerned plaintiff Lisa Springer and de-
fendant Robert Tine who met while attending Columbia University
and developed a close personal relationship.' While working on a
novel, defendant informed plaintiff he had patterned the relationship
between the hero and heroine on their own.4
In 1980, two years after Springer and Tine rancorously terminated
their friendship, the novel "State of Grace" was published by defend-
ant Viking Press.5 Plaintiff based her cause of action for defamation on
physical similarities between herself and the character Lisa Blake and
their common first name.6 Plaintiff contended that people who knew
both her and Tine believed that Lisa Blake and herself were one and
the same person.7
Springer's complaint alleged seven causes of action: (1) and (2)
libel; (3) prima facie tort seeking treble damages; (4) prima facie tort
seeking punitive damages; (5) invasion of privacy under New York
Civil Rights Law; (6) exemplary damages and (7) counsel fees.8 De-
fendants moved to dismiss the complaint, while plaintiff cross moved
for summary judgment on the issue of liability.9 The supreme court,
special term, denied plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment and
granted defendant's motion to the extent of dismissing the third, fourth,
fifth and sixth causes of action."° Both parties appealed."
The Springer court first considered the causes of action dismissed
by the lower court. It succinctly stated that the third cause of action
seeking treble damages was not allowable in the absence of a statutory
1. Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249, (1982).
2. 457 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
3. Id at 247.
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id
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right and here, there was no statute involved. 2 The court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the third and fourth causes of action alleging a
prima facie tort holding that if complete relief can be accorded under
the classical tort of libel, then a prima facie tort may not also be
pleaded. 3
Plaintiff's fifth cause of action alleged invasion of privacy under
Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. 4 The court
held that since "State of Grace" did not use plaintiffs name, portrait or
picture, no cause of action existed.' 5 The Springer court explained that
there was no right of action for invasion of privacy independent of the
statute. 16
As to plaintiff's sixth cause of action, the court held that a claim
for exemplary damages could not stand as a separate cause of action. '
7
The court explained that if the right exists at all it was merely an ele-
ment of an underlying cause of action.'"
In regard to the causes of action for defamation, the court looked
at the similarities and dissimilarities between Lisa Springer and Lisa
Blake. The court found the similarities between the two superficial and
the dissimilarities profound.' 9 It held that in order for a defamatory
statement concerning a character in a fictional work to be actionable,
the character must be so closely related to the real person that a reader
of the book, knowing the plaintiff, would have no difficulty linking the
two.
2 °
The three cases cited by the Springer court, Allen v. Gordon ,2 Ly-
ons v. New American Library, Inc. ,22 and Giaimo v. Literary Guild,23 all
held that for a plaintiff to be entitled to maintain an action for a defam-
atory statement, it must be shown that the publication was "of and con-
cerning" the plaintiff.
In Allen, the fact that plaintiff was the only psychiatrist surnamed
Allen in Manhattan was insufficient to support a cause of action since
12. Id at 247-48.
13. Id at 248.
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id. at 249.
20. Id.
21. 86 A.D.2d 514, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1982), aff'd 452 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1982).
22. 78 A.D.2d 723, 432 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (1980).
23. 79 A.D.2d 917, 434 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1981).
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the book was not "of and concerning" him.24 In Springer, the reason
for disallowing a cause of action was even stronger. There may be only
one Dr. Allen in Manhattan, but there are hundreds of "Lisa's" in New
York.
In Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co. ,25 the court held that the plain-
tiff s burden of proving a statement was "of and concerning" him was
not a light one. The similarities between the fictional work in question
and the plaintiff could not be superficial since the libel must designate
the plaintiff in such a way as to let those who know the plaintiff believe
he is the person meant. 6
In Fetler, the court held that the similarities between the character
Maxim in the novel "The Travelers" and plaintiff "established the nec-
essary links," for a cause of action in defamation.27 The novel depicted
events in the life of a family composed of a father, mother and thirteen
children, of whom ten were boys and the third, fourth and eighth were
girls.28 Such was the exact composition of plaintiffs family. 29
In "The Travelers," Maxim and plaintiff were the same age and
same nationality.3" Their fathers were both ministers and both families
traveled in a bus throughout Europe giving concerts. 3' These factual
similarities were reinforced when the author, plaintiffs brother, told
plaintiff the book "was about our father, the family concerts and me. "32
The court held that Maxim was a prominent character throughout the
novel and that numerous events in the story paralleled and described
the plaintiff.
33
In contrast, in Springer there were only a few similarities between
the plaintiff and the character Lisa Blake in "State of Grace." The only
similarities between the two were their physical attributes, the fact both
went to college and both have the same street address.34
In Springer, unlike in Fetler, profound dissimilarities existed in
both manner of living and in outlook between the two "Lisa's." Lisa
Springer was a tutor, while Lisa Blake was a prostitute who earned
24. 446 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
25. 364 F.2d 650, 653 (2nd Cir. 1966).
26. Id. at 651.
27. Id. at 652.
28. Id at 651.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id. at 652.
34. 457 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49.
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seventy five thousand dollars a year, lived luxuriously on Fifth Avenue
and drove a BMW.35
However, Springer, unlike Fetler, did not take into consideration
the fact that the author of "State of Grace" actually told plaintiff he
had loosely patterned the chapter in question on the relationship be-
tween himself and plaintiff.36 While not conclusive as to the defama-
tion issue, the Springer court could have considered this revelation by
Tine as indicating his intent, especially since Springer and Tine rancor-
ously terminated their relationship.37
In Ladany v. William Morrow & Co., Inc. ,38 defendant Serge
Groussard, a French journalist, wrote a book concerning the 1972 at-
tack on the Israeli Olympic team of which plaintiff was a member. The
book, "The Blood of Israel," contained a number of references to
plaintiff.3 9 The court found that Groussard's account of the attack con-
tained elements of falsity and that the interviews with Ladany which
Groussard described in his book had never taken place.4 °
The court, in holding that a cause of action for defamation did not
exist, explained that in deciding whether a book is defamatory its perti-
nent chapters must be read as a whole.4 "The Court 'will not pick out
and isolate particular phrases;' nor will it 'strain to place a particular
interpretation on the published words.' . . . Rather, the words are
'given their natural import, and their plain and ordinary meaning.' ",42
The court looked at the seventy-five pages that dealt with the attack
and escape, compared it to the book as a whole, and found that plaintiff
was not defamed in any way.43
In applying the Ladany rationale to the facts in Springer, one
should note that the chapter in question covers only ten and one-half
pages.' In "The Blood of Israel" Ladany was a key character, unlike
Lisa Blake in "State of Grace." When compared to "State of Grace" as
a whole, plaintiff's interpretation that the depiction of Lisa Blake was a
portrayal of herself may be unreasonable since the novel concerns Vati-
35. Id at 249.
36. Id at 247.
37. Id
38. 465 F. Supp. 870, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 874.
41. Id. at 876.
42. Id.
43. Id at 878.
44. 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
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can finances and politics. 45
Thus, the holdings of these cases demonstrate that the burden on a
plaintiff to prove a statement is "of and concerning" him is difficult.
The work in question must be viewed as a "whole" and not in isolated
parts. Fetler is a good example of the many common facts a plaintiff
needs to demonstrate to meet this burden.
Although there were only a few factual similarities in Springer, the
court committed a major error, which was mentioned in the dissent,46
by not considering the statement by a former professor who had known
Springer and Tine that he believed Lisa Springer was the Lisa Blake in
"State of Grace." Since the only issue in Springer was identification,47
it seems this statement would have satisfied the test that a reader of the
book, knowing the plaintiff, had no difficulty in linking the two
Lisa's.48
With the stringent requirements for a successful defamatory cause
of action in New York, it seems all too easy for a bitter ex-lover or
friend to write a fictional work and thinly disguise a character in it with
just enough common traits for the plaintiff or a close friend to know it
concerns the plaintiff, but not enough factual similarities to pass the
court's rigid scrutiny.
Margaret Klug
B. Lyrics of Song Not Defamatory
Florida law has recently denied a woman who witnessed a cele-
brated murder trial a cause of action for defamation arising from a
song in which she was portrayed.' In Valentine v. CB.S., Inc. ,2 the
court held there was no cause of action for common law defamation,
invasion of privacy, nor unauthorized publication.
The case culminated in 1975 when defendants Bob Dylan and Jac-
ques Levy wrote a song called "Hurricane."3 The song depicted the
1967 murder trial of prize fighter Rubin "Hurricane" Carter and John
Artis.4 The song in three stanzas also mentioned a witness, Patty Val-
45. Id
46. Id at 250.
47. Id
48. Id. at 249.
I. Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 432 (11th Cir. 1983).
2. Id. at 431.
3. Id.
4. Id
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entine, who testified at the trial.5 Defendant C.B.S. manufactured and
distributed the song and defendant Warner Brothers Publications pub-
lished the sheet music.6
Patty Valentine brought suit alleging common law defamation, in-
vasion of privacy and unauthorized publication of her name.7 The
District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary
judgment for the defendants and plaintiff appealed.8
The Eleventh Circuit first considered plaintiffs argument that
"Hurricane" was defamatory because it implied she participated in a
conspiracy to unjustly convict Carter.9 The court held that the three
stanzas referring to Patty Valentine related to events occurring the
night of the murder and did not allege a conspiracy.' ° The Valentine
court believed plaintiffs interpretation was extreme and not one a rea-
sonable person would make."
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to verify the lyric's ac-
curacy; however, the court found that plaintiff offered nothing to rebut
defendants' testimony that they believed the song did not depict Valen-
tine as a member of the alleged conspiracy.' 2 The court held that the
lyrics were substantially and materially true when compared with
plaintiff's trial testimony.'
3
As to the invasion of privacy claim, plaintiff had stipulated that
the trial, including her testimony, received national publicity.' 4 The
court held that the song concerned matters of public interest and would
not support an invasion of privacy claim even though plaintiff was an
involuntary participant in the trial. 5 The court believed "Hurricane"
disclosed no private facts but only details Valentine had previously dis-
closed through her public trial testimony.'
6
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the
ballad did not commercially exploit plaintiffs name.' 7 The court held
that the use of a name was not harmful "simply because it [was] in-
5. Id
6. Id
7. Id
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 432.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id at 433.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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cluded in a publication sold for profit."' 8
Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., continued the traditional belief found in
Section 13 of Florida's Declaration of Rights which states that every
person may fully speak and write his or her sentiments on all subjects,
although they are responsible for the abuse of that right.' 9 The ques-
tion as to when one has abused such a right was at issue in the present
case and also in McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Co..20
In McCormick the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action for defa-
mation arising from a newspaper story alleging he owed the Internal
Revenue Service $40,000 in back taxes.2' The McCormick court held
that language should not be interpreted by extremes, but construed as
the common mind would understand it.22 The court stated that al-
though the story was not a model of perfect journalism, it did not ac-
cuse plaintiff of tax evasion.23
Similarly, in Valentine, "Hurricane" did not accuse plaintiff of
participating in a conspiracy. In applying the common mind standard,
which the Valentine court correctly used, one can see that the three
stanzas referring to plaintiff all relate to events which occurred the
night of the murder: stanza one describes Patty Valentine entering
from the upper hall of the barroom and seeing the bartender in a pool
of blood; stanza two stated Patty saw three bodies and called the police,
and stanza four had Patty Valentine nodding her head to the statement
by Bello and Bradley that the murderers "jumped into a white car with
out-of-state plates."' 24 It was not until stanza ten that "Hurricane"
stated "Bello and Bradley . . .badly lied" when they testified.25
Using plaintiff's interpretation that by nodding her head she ac-
quiesced in the lie of the other two witnesses, would require connecting
the language of stanza four to stanza ten.26 This would not be a ra-
tional approach since stanzas one, two and four where plaintiff was
mentioned concern events immediately after the murder and nowhere
imply a conspiracy.
27
18. Id
19. Fla. Const. Declaration of Rights, §13, as interpreted in Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla.
198, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (1944).
20. 139 So. 2d 197 (D. Fla. 1962).
21. Id. at 199.
22. Id. at 200.
23. Id at 201.
24. 698 F.2d at 432 n.l.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id.
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The fact that the song stated in stanza four that plaintiff agreed
with Bello and Bradley as to their identification to the police of the
getaway car did not mean plaintiff should be implicated in stanza ten
which stated: "Rubin Carter was falsely tried. The crime was murder
'one,' guess who testified? Bello and Bradley and they both badly
lied."28 If Bob Dylan and Jacques Levy believed Patty Valentine was a
member of the alleged conspiracy, they would have named her as they
directly named Bello and Bradley.
In regard to plaintiffs argument that the song's statements were
untrue, the Valentine court cited Hill v. Lakeland Ledger Publishing
Corp. 29 which followed McCormick's holding that publications should
be substantially true, and mere inaccuracies, not materially affecting
the article, were immaterial. Plaintiffs 1967 trial testimony indicates
she saw the aftermath of a murder, called the police and while doing so
saw two men running to a car with out-of-state plates.30 When one
compares this testimony with "Hurricane's" lyrics it is obvious the
court was correct in holding that the lyrics were substantially and mate-
rially true.31
The Valentine court also correctly decided that no invasion of pri-
vacy claim was presented. Since the seminal case of Cason v. Baskin,32
Florida law has held that the right of privacy does not prohibit the
publication of material which is of legitimate public interest. The law
seems settled that where one, whether willingly or not, becomes in-
volved in a matter of public interest, it is not an invasion of their right
to privacy to publish their name in connection with such matters of
general interest.33
Although a story may be embarrassing or distressful to a plaintiff
this does not mean it cannot be published.34 "Hurricane" describes an
event of legitimate public interest. Indeed, the public was so interested,
a general outcry arose for a new trial.35 Naturally the 1967 trial, in-
cluding Patty Valentine's testimony, received national coverage.
The Eleventh Circuit also correctly affirmed the trial court's hold-
ing that "Hurricane" did not commercially exploit Patty Valentine's
28. Id
29. 231 So. 2d 254, 256 (D. Fla. 1970).
30. 698 F.2d at 432.
31. Id at 432 n.1.
32. 20 So. 2d at 251.
33. Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Company, 83 So. 2d 34, 36 (1955).
34. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 428 (D. Fla. 1982)(U.S. appeal
pending)
35. 698 F.2d at 431.
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name.36 The song concerned the 1967 trial and facts surrounding the
murder; not any one person in particular.37 One's First Amendment
rights would be severely limited if one could not use the name of an
individual without their consent for any purpose.
Thus, Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., correctly allowed Bob Dylan and
Jacques Levy to fully speak and write their opinion in "Hurricane" on
the alleged conspiracy to unjustly convict Rubin "Hurricane" Carter.
By doing so, they did not abuse this right since plaintiff was not de-
famed, her right to privacy was not invaded, and her name was not
commercially exploited.
Margaret Klug
C. Topless Pro Boxer-"Public Figure" Standard
A New York court recently held that High Society Magazine's
publication of a photograph supposedly depicting the plaintiff, Cathy
Davis posing as a topless boxer, was a "newsworthy event" and was
absolutely privileged in Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc. '
The caption of the photograph lead the reader to believe that the
topless boxer was the plaintiff when in fact the topless boxer was not
the plaintiff. Because the plaintiff was a "public figure," she could not
recover unless she proved "actual malice."2 The existence of "actual
malice" was a factual question pertaining to the defendant's state of
mind and did not readily lend itself to summary judgment which the
plaintiff sought.3
Plaintiff, Cathy (Cat) Davis, a champion female boxer, according
to her complaint, a "radio and television personality," brought this ac-
tion claiming that defendants, High Society Magazine, Inc. and
Dorjam Publications, Inc., violated her right to privacy by publishing a
picture of a topless boxer captioned "Cat Davis" in an issue of "Celeb-
rity Skin III" magazine.4
"Celebrity Skin" is a magazine which specializes in photographs
of "well-known women caught in the most revealing situations and po-
sitions."5 The magazines included an article and pictorial of plaintiff
36. Id. at 433.
37. Id. at 432 n. 1.
1. Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315 (A.D. 1982).
2. Id. at 316.
3. Id
4. Id at 310-11.
5. Id at 310.
1984]
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containing three photographs. Two of the photographs appeared to be
of actual boxing matches, which the plaintiff acknowledged were of
her. The third photograph, which particularly offended the plaintiff,
showed two women posing topless. The plaintiff claimed that the top-
less photo was not of her.6
The defendant answered the complaint stating: (1) that the pho-
tograph complained of was sent to High Society from a source in Mary-
land which had been reliable in the past, (2) that the plaintiffs
husband/manager approached High Society with the possibility of do-
ing an interview with the plaintiff, indicating however, that the plaintiff
did not pose nude and (3) that before any deal was reached, High
Society published and distributed the complained of article.7
Beside the topless photograph was the caption "Cat Davis" in bold
print, followed by:
Her vital statistics are: 35-25-35, 16 fights and 15 k.o.'s!
Pound for pound, the 132 lb. beauty is one of the best female
boxers in the ring today. Although her manager/husband Sal
Algieri claims she's never posed nude, this photo sent in by a
reader sure looks like the Top Cat to us.8
Davis filed this action claiming a violation of her right to privacy.
The action was supported by uncontested sworn statements by the
plaintiff and others to the effect that neither of the women in the topless
photograph was in fact the plaintiff.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
on the grounds that defendant High Society had not put forth any alle-
gations to seriously dispute the plaintiff's sworn statements which
tended to prove that neither of the women in the topless photograph
was in fact the plaintiff. The defendant also had not raised the issue
that the plaintiff had consented to the publication.9
On appeal, the defendant' ° claimed that the New York Civil
Rights Law under which the plaintiff brought her action did not apply
in a case where the publication was of a "newsworthy event." The ap-
peal was sustained, the summary judgment reversed, and the case was
remanded for trial on the facts."I
The right to privacy cause of action is relatively new to the tort
6. Id at 311.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id
10. Id at 312.
I1. Id at 316.
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arena and lacks uniformity from state to state despite the active role
that the Supreme Court has played in the formation of the rules that
surround it. Common law did not recognize the right to privacy.12 It
was not until Harvard Law Review published an article by Justices
Warren and Brandeis 13 that the right to privacy was given its judicial
origin in the United States.14 While the Supreme Court has recognized
a national right to privacy in marriage based on the first, third, fourth,
fifth and ninth amendments,' 5 enforcement of an action based on a
right to privacy is still considered to be primarily under the states' po-
lice power.
New York adopted the right to privacy cause of action with a stat-
ute which prohibits the misappropriation of a person's name or likeness
for commercial purposes without their consent. The cause of action
was a statutory reaction to Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. 16 In
Roberson, a flour company began using an image of the infant Rober-
son's face as a trade symbol on their flour bags. The New York court
dismissed the case and refused to recognize Roberson's right to privacy
as grounds for a cause of action.
The following year, the New York legislature enacted sections 50
and 51 of its Civil Rights Law'7 making the misappropriation of one's
name or likeness for purposes of trade or advertising without consent
redressable under New York law.'" While there is case law in New
York tending to infer that New York has accepted a right to privacy
cause of action based on the right to be free from publicity which
places one in a "false light,"' 9 a recent decision stated that whether
12. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 545, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
13. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1891).
14. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
17. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1983).
18. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (A.D. 1982).
19. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221 N.E.2d 840
(1965), where publisher of unauthorized biography of professional baseball player's life
fictionalized facts concerning the player's childhood, his relationship with his father, his
courtship of his wife, important events during their marriage, and during his military serv-
ice. The court held that if the publication is neither factual nor historical, section 5 1 applies
and since the player was a living person, consent must be obtained. See also Nader v. Gen-
eral Motors Corporation, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970), where agents of General Motors con-
ducting a series of interviews with acquaintances of the plaintiff, questioning them about
and casting aspersions upon Nader's political, social, racial, sexual and religious views, and
kept him under surveillance in public places for an unreasonable length of time, violated his
right to privacy despite the fact that there was no misappropriation of his name or likeness
for trade or advertising.
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"false light" is a recognized cause of action in New York is
undecided.2"
The appellate court in Davis interpreted sections 50 and 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law2' as applying only to those cases where
there is a commercial misappropriation of a person's name or likeness
without permission.22 The issue then became whether High Society's
use of the plaintiffs name and photographs was for a commercial
misappropriation.
While the Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy in
some instances under the Constitution, New York courts, in accordance
with the New York statutes, have given the right to privacy action a
narrow interpretation by confining judicial relief to cases involving
"commercial misappropriation."23 "Commercial misappropriation" is
defined more specifically in New York as appropriation for purposes of
"trade" and "advertising."24
Advertising is defined as "solicitation for patronage, intended to
promote the sale of some collateral commodity or service." 25 In Flores
v. Mosler Safe Co. ,26 a safe and vault manufacturer and retailer circu-
lated an article which described a fire that resulted in a sale by the
defendant, and named Flores, the plaintiff, as a possible cause of the
fire. The New York Court of Appeals found that the article was for the
"sole purpose of soliciting purchasers for the defendant's products" and
therefore violated the the New York Civil Rights Law.27 The article
and picture of Cat Davis was not published for the purpose of selling
anyone's services. Therefore, the court found that the article was not
"advertising" for purposes of the New York statute.
20. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 434 N.E.2d
1319 (1982).
21. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1983).
22. The pertinent portion of § 51 reads:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used in this state for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as
above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation using his name, portrait or picture, to pre-
vent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly
used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury, in its discretion,
may award exemplary damages.
Section 50 is the penal version of § 51.
23. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (1982).
24. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1983).
25. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313.
26. 7 N.Y.2d 276, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975, 164 N.E.2d 853 (1959).
27. Id
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"Trade," under New York law, is potentially a broader category
than "advertising" and is not specifically defined. The New York
Court of Appeals inArrington v. New York Times Co. stated that while
profit motive was a necessary element in determining whether a publi-
cation of a name or picture was for "trade" purposes, it was not a suffi-
cient motive."8 In Arrington, a black man protested to having his
picture taken for a feature article entitled "The Black Middle Class:
Making It." He was able to state a cause of action in right to privacy
because it was not clear for purposes of summary judgment that the
photographer and graphic artist had not sold Arrington's photograph
solely for the furtherance of their trade.2 9
In Binns v. Viagraph Co. 30 the New York Court of Appeals con-
fronted the problem of separating publication for trade purposes,
which requires the consent of the person whose name or likeness is
being used, from general publication which does not require consent.
In Binns, a comic book publisher fictionalized the experiences of the
plaintiff who had refused to appear in movies or on stage after he had
been acclaimed as a hero following an accident at sea. The final series
of pictures in the comic book showed drawings of the plaintiff con-
torting his face "solely for the amusement of the spectators."'" It is
unclear whether the opinion relied on the lack of a relationship be-
tween the news story and the final series of pictures or on the fact that
the defendant fictionalized the actual events which took place in the
accident and rescue. Which ever the case, later cases have generalized
from Binns and defined two types of circumstances where a publication
will be considered for trade purposes: (i) when there is no reasonable
relationship between the use of the person's name or likeness and the
matter of public interest,32 and (ii) when there was a substantial
fictionalization.33
The "no real relationship" test 34 was applied in Thomas v. Close-
up, Inc. 31 when Thomas' photograph was used in an article on drug
28. 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944, 434 N.E.2d 1319 (1982).
29. Id. at 443, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
30. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
31. See Malony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 A.D. 166, 172-73, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950)
for a detailed account of the facts in Binns.
32. See generally Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 318 N.Y.S.2d 474,
267 N.E.2d 256 (1971).
33. Pagan v. New York Herald Tribune, 32 A.D.2d 341, 343, 301 N.Y.S.2d 120, aff'd. 26
N.Y.2d 941, 310 N.Y.S.2d 327, 258 N.E.2d 727 (1970).
34. Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 318 N.Y.S.2d 474, 267 N.E.2d
256 (1971).
35. 277 A.D. 848, 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1950).
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dealing when he had no connection with the matter. The use of the
plaintiff's picture was found to have no real relationship to the matter
of public interest (the drug dealing) and therefore was considered to be
for purposes of trade and in violation of the plaintiffs right to privacy
under the New York Civil Laws.
The "substantial fictionalization" test36 was applied in Spahn v. Ju-
lian Messner, Inc. 37 when a well known baseball player sued for inva-
sion of his privacy when a publisher fictionalized facts concerning the
player's childhood, his relationship with his father, his courtship of his
wife, and important events during their marriage and his military serv-
ice. The court held that since there was a substantial fictionalization of
the facts, that the publisher was using the player's name for commercial
exploitation [trade] purposes and therefore violating his right to privacy
without his consent.38
Despite the existance of a statutory right to privacy in New York,
there still exist counterbalancing considerations based on First Amend-
ment freedom of the press. One such consideration is the value of the
article as a newsworthy item. "Newsworthy" has been defined3 9 to the
point that publications can be protected even if they are not based on
news or nonfiction 4° and even if the publications are made solely for
pecuniary profit.
What constitutes a newsworthy item is also a function of the status
of the plaintiff. In the present case the picture was deemed to be a
newsworthy event because Davis was a well known female boxer. If
she had posed semi-clad, the court reasoned that the event would be
newsworthy to a great many people.4'
A second consideration is whether the person is "public" or "pri-
vate." Under New York Times v. Sullivan,42 if a plaintiff is a public
figure or public official, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove that
the publisher acted with the actual intent to publish false information,
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 3 Whether or not a plaintiff is
36. Pagan v. New York Herald Tribune, 32 A.D.2d 341, 343, 301 N.Y.S.2d 120, afld. 26
N.Y.2d 941, 310 N.Y.S.2d 327, 258 N.E.2d 727 (1970).
37. 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 454-55, (1965), aff#d. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221
N.E.2d 543 (1966), aft'd. 21 N.Y.2d 124, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967).
38. 21 N.Y.2d 124, 129, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836, 233 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1967).
39. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315.
40. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d
452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, af'd. 15 N.Y.2d 940, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965).
41. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315.
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. Id. at 283.
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a public figure or public official is a question of law for the court.4 In
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,45 a college football director was deemed
to be a public figure for the limited purpose of an article that accused
him of conspiring to fix football games. Since Butts was deemed to be
a limited public figure, he had the burden to prove that Curtis Publish-
ing Company had knowingly or recklessly disregarded the truth.
Similarly, in the present case, Davis was found to be a limited pur-
pose public figure with respect to publications relating to her boxing.
Even though the article and photo seemed to be at least as interested in
Ms. Davis' breasts as her boxing, the court found that the article suffi-
ciently related to her public image as a boxer to be "absolutely pro-
tected." The term "absolutely" does not preclude the plaintiffs
recovery if she can prove actual malice (knowing or reckless disregard
for the truth of the article).
The Davis court summarized the steps in the analysis of a right to
privacy cause of action in New York against a media defendant by
stating:
[W]here [the] use [of a plaintiffs name or likeness] is associ-
ated with an item that would generally be considered news-
worthy or of public interest and concerns a public official or
figure, the Civil Rights Law is construed so that the use will
be considered for the purposes of trade if it contains substan-
tial falsification or is not really connected with the matter of
public interest, and provided that the defendant was aware of,
or recklessly disregarded, this fact.4
The court reasoned that the article in Davis was newsworthy and
therefore protected under the First Amendment, that the article was not
for advertising or trade purposes under the New York statutes and case
law, and that plaintiff was a public figure for the limited purpose of an
article relating to her boxing career.
The court concluded that since the plaintiff was a public figure,
and since the article was newsworthy and therefore constitutionally
protected, that the plaintiff must prove actual malice (a knowing or
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the publication) in order to
recover on her claim. Since the issue of actual malice is a question of
fact for the jury, based on the thoughts and intentions of the publisher,
44. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 316.
45. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
46. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315, citing Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967).
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there existed a triable issue of material fact and summary judgment
was improperly granted by the trial court.
Daniel Gilson
D. Ms. Wyoming Not Defamed By "'Penthouse"
Penthouse magazine fortuitously escaped liability for defamation
in a spoof of the Miss America Pageant. In Pring v. Penthouse Interna-
tional, Ltd,' the court held that defendants' magazine article referred
to plaintiff. However, it did not hold defendants liable, because the
story could not, as a matter of law, be understood as describing actual
facts. The court found the story to be thoroughly crude, but not ex-
empt from the protection of the first amendment.2
Plaintiff, Kimerli Jayne Pring, competed in the Miss America Pag-
eant as Miss Wyoming. She wore a blue evening gown and twirled a
baton. Defendant, Phillip Cioffari, saw Pring's performance and wrote
a story about a baton-twirling Miss Wyoming who also wore a blue
gown.3 Penthouse published "Miss Wyoming Saves the World" in Au-
gust 1979. Cioffari had previously contributed to Penthouse, and the
magazine relied on his representations that the story was fiction.
The fictional Miss Wyoming was named Charlene. Charlene went
to Atlantic City accompanied only by a high school coach named
Corky. All the other contestants had large, impressive entourages. In
contrast to the singing and dancing of the other contestants, Charlene
felt her baton twirling a pretty mean talent.
The story related, however, how Charlene had discovered her
"real talent." She had fellated a high school football player and sent
him floating into the air. In the talent competition, Charlene simulated
fellatio with her baton, which both shocked and pleased the Pageant
audience.
Charlene lost the contest, but resolved to show the world her real
talent. She led Corky onto the stage and fellated him on national tele-
vision. Were she Miss America, Charlene daydreamed, she would
gladly fellate the entire Soviet Central Committee to preserve world
peace. The cameras remained on Charlene and Corky as he floated off
the stage.
Pring's amended complaint claimed that the story defamed her by
1. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
2. Id. at 443, citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
3. Franklin & Trager, Literature and Libel, 4 Comm/Ent 205, 236 n. 96 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Franklin & Trager].
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saying that Miss Wyoming had fellated two men and imitated fellatio
on her baton. By limiting the complaint to specific instances in the
story, she precluded Penthouse from exploring, generally, her sexual
history.4 The circuit court accepted the jury's finding that the story, as
a whole, referred to Pring.5 The jury awarded her $26.5 million against
Penthouse.6
The trial court also found that Penthouse had acted with "actual
malice" toward Pring7 and that she was a private figure.8 The circuit
court did not address these findings, but they permitted a judgment for
punitive damages and compensatory damages without proof of actual
injury.9 Penthouse's potential liability, therefore, was limited only by
the discretion of a local judge and jury. 0
Penthouse prevailed on appeal because the story could not be rea-
sonably understood as describing "actual facts" about Pring's con-
duct." Though Penthouse presented the story in the factual setting of
the Miss America Pageant in Atlantic City, Charlene's powers of levita-
tion were pure fantasy. The story "present[ed] levitation as the central
theme and as a device to 'save the world.' ",12 Because some of the
charged incidents supposedly took place on national television and in
front of the Pageant audience, there was "a sufficient signal that the
story could not be taken literally."' 3 Pring's witnesses all testified that
4. Pring, 695 F.2d at 441.
5. Id.
6. The trial court reduced the punitive damages component from $25 million to $12.5
million. Franklin & Trager at 226 n. 81. One author has noted that punitive damages may
vastly exceed a state's maximum criminal penalty for malicious libel. Wheeler, The Consti-
tutional Casefor Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 Va. L. Rev. 269, 279 (1983).
Many jurisdictions prohibit insurance against such judgments. Id
7. See Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Intl, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1287 (D.
N.J. 1981). "Actual malice" is defined as "knowledge that [a statement] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964).
8. Pring argued that the "actual facts" requirement was applicable only to public
figures. By inference, therefore, Pring was a private figure for the purpose of her suit. See
Pring, 695 F.2d at 442.
9. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court declined to require
private plaintiffs to prove actual malice before recovering, the states may impose liability for
defamation of private plaintiffs, so long as it is not without fault. Id. at 347. Because pre-
sumed damages are an "oddity" in tort law, a private plaintiff may collect only proven dam-
ages absent proof of "actual malice." Id at 350.
10. First amendment protections do not generally extend to the long arm jurisdiction
analysis. See Scott, Jurisdiction Over the Press.- a Survey andAnalysis, 32 Fed. Com. L. J. 19
(1980).
II. Pring, 695 F.2d at 442.
12. Id at 441.
13. Id
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the story could not be about Pring; "she would not do that."' 4 While
tests of reason are typically questions for the jury, the question of
whether a statement described "actual facts" was a question of law.' 5
The appellate court concluded by noting that ideas which deviate from
public standards and even "vulgar magazines" have the protection of
the first amendment. 16
A defamation defendant's first amendment protections are weaker
against a private plaintiff than against a public official or public
figure.' 7 Still, even a private plaintiff can not recover for an unfavora-
ble opinion. "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction . . . on the competition of other ideas."' 8 The Supreme
Court has recognized that public debate can become volatile; however,
to preserve robust public debate, a defamation suit can succeed only on
a false statement of fact.' 9
Penthouse prevailed on a novel application of this rule. The Pring
court relied on Greebelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler
20
and Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin .21 In Greenbelt, defend-
ant's newspaper reported that plaintiff had been accused of "black-
mail" during a city council debate on the city's planned purchase of
land from plaintiff. The newspaper had accurately attributed such ac-
cusations, and it was clear from the context that plaintiff had not been
accused of the crime of blackmail. Rather, this was a characterization
of a tough bargaining position.22 In Old Dominion Branch, defendant
union published the names of three non-union letter carriers in its "List
of Scabs." The union subsequently defined "scab" as a traitor to God,
country, and family, and more depraved than Benedict Arnold and Ju-
das Iscariot. The court treated this as an abusive opinion, nonetheless
permissible in the heated context of a labor dispute.23
The Pring court did not distinguish fact from opinion, but fact
14. Id. at 441-42. This seems more probative of the propositions that Pring's acquaint-
ances did not identify Charlene as Pring or that they did not believe the story. This would
have been relevant to the proof of actual damages.
15. Id at 442.
16. Id at 443.
17. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254; Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967);
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323.
18. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
19. See infra notes 20 and 21.
20. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
21. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
22. Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 13-14.
23. OldDominion Branch, 418 U.S. at 283-84.
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from fantasy.24 The distinction is, at best, a tenuous safeguard for the
preservation of free-wheeling public debate.25 The dissent in Pring
considered levitation, dreams, and public performance as fiction, but
fellatio as a specific deviant act. Fantasy was merely a gratuitous em-
bellishment of fact.26 Therefore, the swing of one vote would have pre-
vented Penthouse from benefitting from the court's expansion of the
"actual facts" requirement.
But for the the fanciful nature of the story, Penthouse would have
faced an unexpected and open-ended liability.27 Robert Hofler, a senior
editor at Penthouse, had qualms about the story because he thought the
subject had been overdone satirically. Penthouse's attorney asked only
if the article was fiction. James Goode, editorial director, found noth-
ing to indicate that the article was anything but fiction.28 Furthermore,
Penthouse relied on Cioffari's representation that the story was purely
fictional.29
Denoting a story as fiction does not insulate its publisher from lia-
bility for defamation.30 However, applying the "actual malice" stan-
dard to fiction has defied clear analysis.3 ' The concern in defamation
law is with "defamatory lies masquerading as truth. 32 But fiction is
not intended to convey truth and is always, in some sense, false. It
would be "absurd to infer [actual] malice" simply because a piece of
fiction is false.33
24. Pring, 695 F.2d at 441. See Franklin & Trager at 230-32. The authors described
"faction" as a fictional work mythologizing real persons or events. Liability would turn on
whether the reader would understand the work to be describing real events. For example
see, R. Coover, The Public Burning, which depicted Richard Nixon attempting to seduce
Ethel Rosenberg shortly before her execution.
25. There is no privilege, per se, on the discussion of public issues because it would
require courts to evaluate purported public issues. The status of the plaintiff is a more judi-
cially manageable standard. Gertz, 376 U.S. at 346. For a touch of rhetorical flourish, how-
ever, Penthouse might have argued, perhaps ironically, that it should be free to parody
beauty pageants because they demean the status of women.
26. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443-44 (Breitenstein, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
27. See supra notes 6 and 9.
28. Miss America Pageant, 524 F. Supp. at 1285.
29. Id at 1287.
30. Pring, 695 F.2d at 442.
31. Franklin & Trager at 206-07. See also Silver, Libel, the 'Higher Truths' of Art, and
the First Amendment, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1065 (1978).
32. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 871, 603 P.2d 454, 461,
160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 359 (1979) (Bird, concurring).
33. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 88, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 44-45, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979). Franklin & Trager have suggested four paradigms to resolve the prob-
lem of standards of fault for defamation in fiction. If an author publishes a veiled attack,
intent is clearly present. Franklin & Trager at 223. If an author fails adequately to disguise
a prominent figure, he ought to be liable for recklessness. Id at 225. A failed disguise of an
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The Supreme Court has prohibited liability for defamation with-
out fault.34 The Pring court discharged Penthouse on the basis of the
chance inclusion of "levitation" in the story and did not discuss how
Penthouse was at fault. A less farcical literary or dramatic work on the
same subject matter, and developed in substantially the same way,
would not have escaped liability. This suggests a return to the old stan-
dard of "not who was aimed at, but who was hit."35 The open ques-
tion, then, is the appropriate standard of conduct to avoid liability for
"referring" to an unexpected plaintiff in a work of fiction.
There is little authority to resolve the question, but the "actual
malice" standard is subjective. It relates not to whether a reasonable
publisher ought to have investigated, but to whether he entertained se-
rious doubts as to the truth of a statement.36
A restatement of the "actual malice" standard for a reference in
fiction to an unexpected plaintiff would require that the defendant have
entertained serious doubts as to whether the statement would be under-
stood as referring to a particular plaintiff.
Because Cioffari had seen Pring on stage, he was arguably reckless
in not further disquising his fictional baton twirler.37 Penthouse, how-
ever, relied on Ciofarri's statement that the story was fiction and proba-
bly had no subjective doubt. Penthouse might have been negligent if it
had a duty to investigate whether a reasonable person would identify
Charlene as Pring.
38
In Bindrim v. Mitchell,39 defendant Mitchell attended a nude mar-
athon encounter group with plaintiff psychologist Bindrim. She wrote
a scurrilous and false account of the session and published it through
defendant Doubleday. The court stated that Doubleday was entitled to
rely on Mitchell's statement that the work was fiction prior to publish-
ing the hardback edition. However, prior to publishing the paperback
edition, Doubleday received a letter from Bindrim's attorney informing
"ordinary citizen" ought to merit actual damages upon proof of negligence. Id at 226. If an
author has forgotten a plaintiff, he ought to be liable for negligence. Id. at 227. To prevent
an accidental description, an author ought to consult readily available directories. Id at
229-30.
34. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
35. Laudati v. Stea, 44 R.I. 303, 306, 117 A. 422, 424 (1922).
36. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1968).
37. See supra note 3. For example, Charlene could easily have haled from another state.
38. See supra note 35, Franklin & Trager at 229-30. Another court, however, found
Penthouse's reliance on Cioffari to be justified. Miss America Pageant 524 F. Supp. at 1283.
Further, a negligence standard arguably has a potential to erode the freedom of the press.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
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it of Bindrim's claim. Doubleday's duty to investigate arose when it
had, or should have had, serious doubts as to whether Bindrim was the
psychologist in the novel and whether he would be defamed.'
The Bindrim standard is analogous to the subjective "actual mal-
ice" standard. However, Bindrim was a public figure4' and had to
prove "actual malice" to recover anything.42 Pring, as a private plain-
tiff, was entitled to recover for mere negligence, but only upon proof of
actual injury.43 Given that all the witnesses from her community who
testified stated that the story could not be about Pring,4 her damages
might have been nominal.
More serious fictional and dramatic investigation of pressing social
issues, such as prostitution, drug abuse, and domestic violence, are of
undoubted value. It is not unreasonable, however, to require a negli-
gent publisher or producer to compensate a private person for actual
injury to reputation. But Gertz precludes the award of punitive or
"presumed damages" for mere negligence. A private plaintiff defamed
in a fictional work ought, therefore, to prove actual damages or that the
defendant was aware of the possibility of defaming the plaintiff before
he may recover. Imposing such a burden on plaintiffs will create a
more definite limit on such liability than the whim of a home town
jury.
William L. Cummings
E. Falsely Portraying Person As a Prostitute is Defamatory
Picture this scenario: you are at home watching television in the
company of your husband and two year old son. Not allowing your
son to view any fictional sex or violence which could conceivably have
a detrimental effect upon his development, you feel that an ABC docu-
mentary can do no harm. This one is an hour long "ABC News
Closeup" entitled "Sex for Sale: The Urban Battleground." The next
thing you know, in the midst of a discussion of the large number of
prostitutes which are now plaguing our nation's fair cities, appears a
candid scene of you walking down the street . ...
At the very least you would hope that your defamation claim
40. Id at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
41. Id. at 71 n. 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
42. See supra note 17.
43. See supra note 9.
44. Pring, 695 F.2d at 441-42.
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against ABC would reach the jury and not be thrown out of court by
way of summary judgment.
In the Sixth Circuit case Clark v. American Broadcasting Compa-
nies,' the court determined that as it was possible that Ruby Clark's
appearance in a television broadcast concerning prostitution and its ef-
fects upon the neighborhoods in which it exists was capable of a defam-
atory interpretation, granting summary judgment for the broadcaster
was improper.2 Ruby Clark is not now, and never has been, a prosti-
tute. Further, Ruby Clark was not a resident of the neighborhood por-
trayed as effected by the plague of prostitution, nor was she interviewed
as to her views on the subject matter of the broadcast in which she was
portrayed. Therefore, her "participation" in the broadcast was not
within the scope of Michigan's qualified privilege.' Additionally, the
court concluded that Ruby Clark did not have to prove that ABC acted
with actual malice because '[p]laintiff is not a public figure for all
purposes."4
What were the circumstances which placed Ruby Clark in such a
precarious position? On April 22, 1977, ABC aired a broadcast in or-
der to show the effects of commercialized sex on America's cities, towns
and neighborhoods. The segment in which Ruby clark appeared fo-
cused on the devastating effect of street prostitution on a middle class
neighborhood in Detroit. Several women, not necessarily prostitutes,
were photographed as they walked down a public street.
The first woman was white, obese, approximately fifty years old,
wearing a hat and carrying a shopping bag in both hands.
The second woman was black, slightly obese, approximately forty
years old, wearing large framed glasses and was exiting a grocery store.
1. 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir., 1982).
2. Id at 1213.
3. Id at 1216.
4. Id. at 1217. When a person is a public figure, a plaintiff must prove actual malice in
order to recover for defamation. For purposes of the first and fourth amendments, the Court
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974), defined "public figures" as follows:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prom-
inence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power
and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
The court in Gertz noted that public figures may recover from injury to reputation only on
clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. 418 U.S. at 342. See Street v. National
Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed,
454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 U.S. 966 (1977).
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The third woman was Ruby Clark. She was photographed using
frontal close-ups. She appeared to be in her early to mid twenties,
black, slim, quite attractive and stylishly dressed. She was wearing
large earrings and had long hair which was pulled up above her head.
While these three women were shown in this documentary the dia-
logue included comments that the street prostitutes were often black,
"[b]ut for black women whose homes were there, the cruising white
customers were an especially humiliating experience."5
Seconds after Ruby Clark's appearance, a different black female
appeared on the screen and stated, "[a]lmost any woman who was
black and on the street'was considered to be a prostitute herself. And
was treated like a prostitute."6
When Ruby Clark's appearance is juxtaposed with that of the two
matrons and with this dialogue, what possible conclusions would the
average viewer draw in their own minds as to the livelihood of Ruby
Clark? She certainly did not look at all like the two obese, older wo-
men. Also, she, unlike the other two, was attractive. And further,
Ruby Clark is black.
The district court granted ABC's motion for summary judgment.'
Concluding that the broadcast was not libelous, the court reasoned that
Ruby Clark's appearance did not suggest that her activity parallelled
that of a street prostitute.8
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit took a more personal view than did
the district court, and reasoned that Ruby Clark's appearance was ca-
pable of at least two interpretations, one of which was defamatory. 9
Stereotypical behavior commonly associated with prostitution includes
"wearing suggestive clothing, suggestive walking, overt acts of solicita-
tion, and the like."'" However, unlike the district court, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's discussion of this stereotypical behavior commonly associated
with prostitution included the fact that Ruby Clark appeared on the
broadcast during a discussion of street prostitution. " "Viewed in this
manner, Plaintiff was either portrayed as a prostitute or could reason-
5. 684 F.2d at 1211.
6. Id
7. Id at 1210.
8. Id. at 1212.
9. Id at 1213. That the broadcast is reasonably capable of a non-defamatory meaning
is clear from the district court's reasoning. The district court focused solely on whether
plaintiffs behavior during the broadcast was similar to the stereotypical actions commonly
associated with prostitution in its determination that the broadcast was not libelous.
10. Id
11. Id.
1984]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
ably be mistaken for a prostitute."' 2 Consequently, it was for the jury
to decide whether the broadcast was understood as being defamatory. 3
The court in Clark cites to Schultz v. Newsweek, Inc. '4 in pointing
out that "[tihere is no rule which favors either granting or denying mo-
tions for summary judgment in defamation cases."' 5 In Schultz, plain-
tiff brought a defamation suit against Newsweek after Newsweek
published reports labelling plaintiff as an underworld figure and con-
necting him with the investigation of the disappearance of a union
leader. 6 Summary judgment was granted for Newsweek after showing
conclusively that a reasonable person, given the facts presented, would
have found this plaintiff to be involved in the Mafia.' 7
In Ruby Clark's case, a reasonable person given the facts
presented, which would have been only those facts presented on the
News Close-Up, could have conclusively perceived Ruby Clark to be
involved in the business of sex. Minimally, the ambiguity created when
Ruby Clark's appearance was viewed within the context of the News
Close-Up rendered the broadcast susceptible to both a defamatory and
a nondefamatory interpretation, but certainly not solely a nondefama-
tory meaning. Therefore, it would have required a great deal of confu-
sion as to who the parties to this case were to grant a summary
judgment in favor of the party who made it so simple for the viewers to
erroneously perceive Ms. Clark's profession. In fact, the documentary
made it seem so obvious that Ruby Clark was a prostitute, that she was
propositioned, was shunned by church members, and was confronted
12. Id
13. Id; Schultz v. Reader's Digest Association, 468 F. Supp. 551, 554 (E.D. Mich.,
1979); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F.Supp. 893, 902 (W.D.
Mich., 1980), aft'd, 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir., 1981).
In Schultz, plaintiff instituted a libel action against a magazine publisher on a claim
that he had been defamed in an article entitled Why Jimmy Hoffa Had to Die, which con-
cerned the disappearance of this former labor leader. 468 F. Supp. 551, 553. If the maga-
zine article was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory interpretation, then it would be for
the jury to determine whether that was the way the article was understood. 468 F. Supp. at
554.
In Michigan United Conservation Clubs, an organization of hunters and several of its
members sued the news division of CBS claiming that they were defamed by two of the
defendant's television broadcasts concerning the subject of hunting. 485 F. Supp. 893, 894.
The court stated that if the publication was capable of more than one meaning, and one of
those meanings was defamatory, then it would be for the jury to determine whether the
communication was understood as being defamatory. 485 F. Supp. at 902.
14. 668 F.2d 911 (1982).
15. 684 F.2d at 1212.
16. 668 F.2d at 913.
17. Id
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with allegations that she was a prostitute. ' 8 Moreover, after the broad-
cast aired, two potential employers refused to hire Ms. Clark because
they feared her "employment" would hurt their businesses. 9
In Schultz, the information relied upon fit the reporter's own defi-
nition of "underworld figure" as "someone who has had more than an
occassional brush with the forces of law and order."2 ° Further, there
was no evidence that the reporter had reason to believe this definition
was false.2' This is in direct contrast to Clark where it is evident that
the producers of this broadcast were aware of the stereotypical prosti-
tute, yet had no evidence whatsoever that Ruby Clark was a prostitute.
However, they still photographed her in the context of this
documentary.
Under Michigan law, there is a qualified privilege to publish infor-
mation which is in the public interest, which imposes a burden on
plaintiff of proving defendants acted with actual malice.22 The court
found that ABC did not act with actual malice.23 However, as a matter
of law, the court also determined that this qualified privilege did not
apply in this case because "[a] newspaper or television broadcast con-
cerning this incidental plaintiff is not in the public interest. '24 Al-
though it can easily be argued that activities of street prostitutes are
clearly in the public interest, Ruby Clark's participation in this broad-
cast was not in the public interest. 25 Ruby Clark was not a prostitute,
nor was she a resident of the Detroit neighborhood discussed in the
segment. It was not her reactions to street prostitution which were
filmed, nor was she being harrassed by street prostitution. "Therefore
her picture as she walked down a public street has absolutely no con-
nection with the subject matter of the broadcast," and was not within
Michigan's qualified privilege.26
In Lawrence v. Fox,27 the court did a thorough job of explaining
18. Clark, 684 F.2d at 1211.
19. Id.
20. 668 F.2d at 914.
21. Id
22. Schultz, 668 F.2d at 914.
23. Clark, 684 F.2d at 1214.
24. Id at 1216.
25. Id
26. ld at 1217.
27. 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959). In Lawrence, a libel action against writers, newspapers, and a
publishing company was brought by a former city deputy superintendent of police for publi-
cation of articles charging the deputy superintendent with fraud and corruption, protection
of criminals and manipulation of liquor licenses, perjury, trickery and deceit. The language
employed in the reports was "abusive and extreme, vitriolic in its terms." ld at 720. The
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the "why's," "what's," and "how's" behind "the privilege." It is a ques-
tion for the court whether a privilege exists at all and to determine
whether the circumstances under which the publication (or for pur-
poses of this case, the photography) was made were such as to make the
occasion privileged.2"
There is no need, at this date in our history, to urge that it is
necessary to free institutions that the press itself be free. To-
day it is. The real issue before us is how free. Governmental
interference is not the only threat to its freedom. On the con-
trary, a narrow or restrictive interpretation of the law of privi-
lege in libel actions is equally dangerous. The publisher often
faces a cruel dilemma: the more serious the charge of wrong-
doing by a public official, more urgent the need for its airing.
Yet, the more serious the charge, the greater the libel. It is in
this uneasy and menacing situation that the law provides the
publisher a sanctuary of sorts, the defense of privilege. It is
no fortress, as we shall see. The defense interposed is that of
privilege.29
Using this thought as a mere basis for "why have the privilege?", it
becomes apparent that the American Broadcasting Company is making
an effort to stretch this privilege to the limits of abuse. It is true that the
privilege afforded varies with the importance of the social issues at
stake.30 However, the privilege should not be extended by way of giv-
ing power to the media to destroy the lives and/or reputations of inno-
cent bystanders.
At one extreme we have loose gossip, thoughtless or malevo-
lent. Here the damage to the individual's reputation is bal-
anced only against the social desirability of the unbridled
tongue, the frenetic lashings of the scorpion's tail. Under the
statutes of Edgar and Canute the tongue itself was forfeited.
Modern law is more lenient. We class it simply as a case of
"no privilege" and leave the parties to their proofs. At the
other extreme are those occasions wherein the social interest
involved in publication is so great as to immunize even delib-
erately malicious attacks upon one's character.3'
Supreme Court of Michigan held that whether the publication was privileged was a question
of law for the court and the lower court erred in submitting the question to the jury. Id at
725.
28. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 619A (1981).
29. Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 720 (1959).
30. Id at 721.
31. Id
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Thus, perhaps it is a given that a discussion of selling sex as a commod-
ity may be an important social issue because of the tremendous harm it
causes to so many people. However, public policy as well as common
sense should dictate that the privilege not be used as a means of dis-
playing anything out of context. With the dialogue accompanying
Ruby clark's stroll down the public thoroughfare, her portrayal was
unquestionably used out of context.
In determining whether the privilege applies, the extrinsic circum-
stances, "the occasion," must be looked at rather than the actual words
used.32 This rule means no more than that the court must look to the
extrinsic situation and not to the actual words used in order to deter-
mine whether the defamation is privileged.33 The extrinsic circum-
stances in the case of Ruby Clark were that the American Broadcasting
Company was reporting about an important area of civil concern. This
creates a qualified privilege.34 But having determined this, an addi-
tional step must be taken, namely, the ascertainment of the scope of
this privilege.35 Such privilege does not justify inaccuracies in the pub-
lished report, or in this case, such an inaccurate photographed
portrayal.36
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Nuyen v. Slater,37 included in
its discussion of whether a qualified privilege exists the following:
A publication is conditionally and qualifiedly privileged
where circumstances exist, or are reasonably believed by the
defendant to exist, which casts on him the duty of making a
communication to a certain other person to whom he makes
such communication in the performance of such duty, or
whether the person is so situated that it becomes right in the
interests of society that he should tell third persons certain
facts, which he in good faith proceeds to do. This general
idea has been otherwise expressed as follows: The communi-
cation made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
person communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty, it is privileged if made to a person hav-
ing corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains
32. Bowerman v. Detroit Free Press, 283 N.W. 642, 644 (1939).
33. Id In the libel case, Bowerman, the extrinsic circumstances were that the defendant's
newspaper was reporting a judicial proceeding, and because it was a judicial proceeding a
qualified privilege was created.
34. See Bowerman, 283 N.W. 642 (1939).
35. Id
36. See Bowerman, 283 N.W. 642 (1939).
37. 127 N.W.2d 369 (1964).
19841
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JO URNAL
matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable and
although the duty is not a legal one, but only a moral or social
duty of imperfect obligation. The essential elements of a con-
ditionally privileged communication may accordingly be enu-
merated as good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement
limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and
publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.
The privilege arises from the necessity of full and unrestricted
communication concerning a matter in which the parties have
an interest or duty, and is not restricted within any narrow
limits. 38
Perhaps, this is legal jargon meaning that how and when some-
thing is said, or portrayed, is just as important as what is said, in the
determination of whether or not the privilege can apply. Thus, when
separating out the specific facts, it might appear that ABC had the priv-
ilege of using Ruby Clark in its educational documentary. But when
viewed as a whole, the subject matter, the other matronly women por-
trayed, the dialogue, Ruby clark's attire, figure and general attractive-
ness, and the woman speaking immediately after Ruby Clark's
"appearance," it is clear that an inaccuracy was portrayed which the
privilege will not justify. "[W]e are looking at the stage, not at the
script. 39 When appearing in the middle of fat, older women during a
conversation of the embarrassing effects of street prostitution, it is quite
simple for a television viewer to assume that the fat, older women were
not prostitutes, but that Ruby Clark was.
Even more elementary to the discussion is that Michigan's quali-
fied privilege does not extend "to plaintiffs who are not the focus of the
alleged public interest publication."4 It is indisputable that Ruby
Clark was merely an incidental figure in the broadcast. What did the
public gain by viewing this non-prostitute while simultaneously receiv-
ing the description of prostitutes, in which Ruby Clark's appearance
"coincidentally" fit? Where would society be if in the name of the First
Amendment the media were allowed to pick and choose unrelated indi-
viduals to fit into public interest news stories? Ruby Clark had abso-
lutely nothing to do with the broadcast. She was not even given the
opportunity to espouse her own views on the subject matter in which
she was portrayed.
It is difficult to disagree with the fact that the media is an all im-
38. Id at 372.
39. Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 722 (1959).
40. Clark v. American Broadcasting Companies, 684 F.2d 1208, 1216 (1982).
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portant and all encompassing force in our democratic and free society.
Therefore, the implications of the decision in Clark v. American Broad-
casting Companies, in its broadest sense, serve as reins on the media, an
extremely influential entity.
As the manner in which society views prostitutes is not, as mathe-
maticians would put it, a constant, I agree with the court's holding.
Ruby Clark's appearance in the broadcast was capable of a defamatory
interpretation.
Joni Greenberg

